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Abstract

In this paper I investigate the effectiveness of the monetary authority's
borrowing policies in resolving exchange rate crises.

I show why obtaining

loans or lines of credit in foreign currency may avoid, at least temporarily,
the devaluation of a fixed exchange rate.

I also consider the problem of the

optimal size of the loan and/or the line of credit.

The analysis focuses on a

particular episode of foreign exchange rate pressure, during the troubled
years between 1894 to 1896.

My conclusion is that the borrowing policy

followed by the U.S. Treasury in those years was effective in avoiding the
collapse of the United States' gold standard.

Moreover, my findings indicate

that the amount of the borrowing undertaken by the Treasury might have been
optimal.

1

1.

Introduction

Exchange rate crises have recently received considerable attention.
Theoretical research started by Krugman [1979] and expanded by Flood and
Garber [1984], Grilli [1986], Obstfeld [1986] among others, has stressed the
relationship between collapses of fixed exchange rates and speculative runs on
the international reserves of the monetary authorities.

Empirical application

of these models has been attempted by Blanco and Garber [1986] for the case of
the recurrant devaluation of the Mexican peso during the 1970's and the early
1980's.

Exchange rate crises, however, are not a recent phenomenon, rather

they have characterized the history of the international monetary system.

The

abandonment of the gold standard at the start of World War I, the progressive
deterioration and definitive breakdown of the classical gold standard in the
20's and early 30's, and the numerous readjustments of the exchange rates
during the the Bretton-Woods period demonstrate how exchange rate crises are
not a unique characteristic of contemporary exchange rate systems.
An interesting empirical problem is to analyze how monetary authorities
have behaved when faced with such exchange rate emergencies.

Typically, in

these circumstances, foreign exchange authorities have tried to borrow
international reserves.

In this paper I show why obtaining a line of credit

in foreign currency may be an effective policy in order to avoid a
devaluation, and I discuss how to determine the optimal size of the loan.
This is done through the study of a particular episode: the exchange rate
crises of 1894-96.

There are several reasons that justify the choice of this

specific incident.

First, because of a subsequent Congressional

investigation, we have a complete and detailed record of the actions
undertaken by the Treasury at that time.

Second, I think that it is

interesting to see how certain policies, typical of today's central bank

2

operations, were already known and used in times when a central bank did not
exist.
The structure of the paper is as follows.

In section two the essential

economic and institutional environment of the period is reviewed.

Section

three models the relationship between borrowing and the viability of a gold
standard.

In section four the framework developed in section three is used to

study the exchange rate crisis of 1894-96.

Section five analyzes the issue of

the optimal amount of foreign exchange loans, and applies the result to
examine the characteristics of the Treasury borrowing operation of February
1895.

2.

Section 6 concludes.

The Essential Institutional and Economic Environment of the Period 1

After January 1, 1879, as prescribed by the Resumption Act of June 14,
1875, legal tender paper money had to be redeemable in coins.

Even if "coin"

meant, at the time, either gold or silver, the Treasury always redeemed in
gold, de facto supporting a gold standard system.
In order to guarantee the redemption of the notes, the Treasury had two
alternatives:

(i) to use the surplus revenue or (ii) to issue bonds of the

kind authorized by the Refunding Act (July 14, 1870). 2
The viability of the gold standard did not present any problems during
the 80's.

In particular, between 1885 and 1890, a constant government surplus

guaranteed a large amount of gold reserves, well above the required minimum of
1

For a more detailed analysis of the period, see Garber and Grilli (1985),
and Simons (1968).
2

The Refunding Act authorized the Treasury to issue three different kinds of
bonds: (1) 10 year@ 5% (2) 15 year@ 4.5% (3) 30 year@ 4%.

3

$100 million. 3

The period of monetary instability started early in the 90's.

The underlying cause of the precariousness of the period was excess money
supply that was generated by two different sources:
(a) Between 1890 and 1893, the Sherman Act caused a steep increase in the
paper component of the money supply, by forcing the Treasury to make huge
monthly purchases of silver in exchange for a new kind of paper money (the
Treasury Notes of the 1890's). 4
(b) During the years between 1893 and 1896 the Congress did not allow any
form of borrowing to finance the large and continuous deficit that originated
in the period.

The Treasury had the option of either monetizing the deficit

by using previously accumulated legal tender, or issuing the kind of bonds
authorized by the Resumption Act, once the gold reserves had fallen below the
minimum. 5
During those years the viability of the gold standard became more and
more uncertain; the Congress and the Treasury had to take various actions in
order to avoid its collapse:

the Sherman Act was repealed November 1, 1893

and the Treasury undertook four bond issues, in February 1894 ($50 million),

3

This lower bound for the gold reserves originated in the Act of July 12,
1882 which established that any time the gold reserves of the Treasury fell
below $100 million, the Treasury had to suspend the issuing of gold
certificates. After that, $100 million was considered to be the minimum level
of the gold reserves in the Treasury, as set down by the Judiciary Committee
of the House of Representatives in a report submitted on July 6, 1892. The
report stated: "That it was the intention of the Congress to fix the minimum
amount of this reserve fund at $100 million gold and gold bullion, and that it
should be maintained at that sum, seems clear from the language of the Act [of
1882]."
4

The Sherman Silver Purchase Act was passed on July 14, 1890.

5
Note that, by the Act of May 31, 1878, the Treasury was forbidden to cancel
or retire any of the U.S. notes then outstanding.
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in November 1894 ($50

million), in February 1895 ($62.3 million, plus

approximately $20-25 million in lines of credit), and in January 1896 ($100
million).

3.

Borrowing Operations and the Viability of the Gold Standard

This section presents a simple model which permits one to analyze the
effects of foreign currency borrowing policies on the viability of a gold
standard.

An international gold standard, like the one prevailing in the

1890's, can be interpreted as a fixed exchange rate regime, where the fixed
parities are given by the ratios of the gold content of the various
currencies.

Similarly, the gold reserves of the monetary authorities can be

interpreted as foreign currency reserves.

In the rest of the paper, we assume

that the international economy is composed by two countries: a domestic
economy (the U.S.), and a foreign economy (the U.K.).
Formally we can measure the viability of a fixed exchange rate system at
time t with the probability that a speculative attack on the fixed parity will
occur at time t+l.

This probability function can be obtained from the

following monetary model of the exchange rate for a small economy: 6

(1)

it - it *

Et et+l - et

(2)

(3)

6

This model has been widely used in speculative attack literature. For a
more detailed explanation of solutions to these types of models, see Flood and
Garber (1984a), Blanco and Garber (1986) and Grilli (1986).

5

Herem, p, e, and y are the logarithms of money stock, price level,
exchange rate in dollars per pound and a measure of real activity; i is the
nominal interest rate and wand u are uncorrelate d stochastic disturbance s.
The parameters a,

p,

~

are all positive, and Et is the expectation operator

conditional on information at time t.

British variables are marked with

asterisks, and all variables are assumed to be exogenous to the exchange rate. 7
The model can be solved for the (shadow) flexible exchange rate:

1
l+a

(4)

where

- w

t+j

- p *t+j - u t+j

(5)

The money stock in a gold standard can be defined as the sum of two
components:

(i) the gold in circulation plus the part of the paper money

backed by gold reserves in the Treasury and (ii) the silver in circulation
plus the paper money not backed by gold reserve, which I defined as the
domestic component of the money supply (DCt).
The basic idea underlying the speculative attack literature is that the

7

The actual form of equation (3) that we used in the empirical section is:

p

t

-

+k

where k is constant such that mean(e)=mea n (p-p *+k). This is to make the
price levels, which are index numbers, compatible with the exchange rate which
is in$/ L.

6

fixed parity will be viable until it becomes profitable to attack it.

This

will happen as soon as the exchange rate expected to prevail right after the
attack (the shadow exchange rate) exceeds the given parity. 8

The level of the

shadow exchange rate depends critically on what kind of regime is expected to
prevail once the gold standard collapses.

I assume that, in this

circumstance, a paper money that is convertible in silver will be established.
In the post-attack regime, to which equations (1) - (5) refer, gold goes
out of circulation.

The money stock is given by the sum of the domestic

component and the amount of reserves still in the Treasury after the collapse
of the gold standard.

By defining Gm to be the level of gold reserves at

which the Treasury abandons the defense of the gold standard (5) can be
rewritten as:

wt+j - p * t+j - ut+j

(6)

In this framework, the probabilty that a speculative attack will occur in the
next period is given by:

Pr( 1!..

~

[1:a)j Etht+j

~

e)

(7)

j=o

where e is the fixed parity.

It is now easy to see why borrowing gold

decreases the probability that an attack will occur during the next period.

8

We are referring to a buying attack, i.e. when speculators buy foreign
reserves (gold) from the monetary authorities, expecting to profit from a
devaluation of the domestic currency. For a model in which selling attacks,
i.e. attacks aiming to profit from a revaluation of the currency, are also
considered, see Grilli (1986).

7

Borrowing, in fact, reduces the post-attack money supply and, therefore, it
reduce the level of the h

.'s.
t+J

Grilli (1986) and Buiter (1986).

Similar results can be found in Garber and
9

Therefore, to issue bonds or to obtain

lines of credit provides an effective instrument to enhance the viability of
the system in the short run.
If our interpretation of the facts is correct, the probability of a
speculative attack on the gold standard between 1889 (the year in which our
analysis starts) and 1896 should have followed a specific time pattern.

In

particular, the probaility should start to increase gradually by mid-1890,
when the Sherman Act was passed.

It should then reach a peak around the end

of 1893 when the Sherman Act was repealed.

From 1894 to 1896 it should

decrease back toward zero, and the reduction should be concentrated in
discrete jumps occurring at the time of the borrowing operations.

In order to

verify the validity of our analysis, in the next section we estimate the
probability of the collapse of the gold standard between January 1889 and
December 1896.

4.

Estimating the Probability of a Speculative Attack

In order estimate the probability of a speculative attack we have to
compute the expected shadow exchange rate, which is a function of all future
expected ht+j·
variable ht.

The first step in our procedure will be to estimate the
This requires estimates of the money demand function and an

assumption about the value of Gm.

In the following we assume that the

Treasury will give up the defence of the parity once the gold reserves in its

9
Buiter also proves that in the long run the probability of an attack will
increase as a result of borrowing, because of the increase in interest costs.

8

vault are completely exausted (i.e. Gm= 0).
Since we are interested in computing the post-attack floating (shadow)
exchange rate, we should be estimating the money demand function prevailing
during the post-attack flexible exchange rate regime.

Since the gold standard

did not collapse, the only data available refers to the fixed exchange rate
regime.

However, the demand for cash balances need not be dependent on the

particular exchange rate regime.

On the contrary, it could be shown that

under reasonable conditions this will not be the case. 10

I assume that this

independenc e property holds and I estimate the money demand equation (1) using
monthly data in the period 1889:01-189 6:12. Given the potential dependence of
the domestic interest rate on the money supply process, consistent estimates
were obtained by instrumenta l variables, using the British interest rate, the
lagged domestic output and the lagged domestic interest rate as instruments 11 .
The estimate of the money demand parameters are given in Table 1.
coefficient s are significativ e and have the expected signs.

All

We can now

compute an estimate of ht using equation (6) under the assumption that Gm

0.

To estimate time t shadow exchange rate we also need to compute Et ht+j for j
~

0.

In order to calculate these expected values, we must make some

assumption about the stochastic processes governing the set of state variables
included in ht.

A natural way to interpret ht is as the difference between

money supply (dct) and the factors determining money demand (i.e. mdt =
1Yt+j - ai * t+j + wt+j + p *t+j + ut+j).

~

+

A crucial characteris tic of the period

10 Penati

and Pennacchi (1986), for example, show that this type of
independenc e holds if the representat ive agent has a separable logarithmic
utility function in consumption and real cash balances.
11 In

the appendix we provide a detailed description of the data. In obtaining
the estimate presented in Table 1 we also correct for the autocorrela tion in
the residuals.

9

under consideration is the change that took place in the domestic credit
creation.

Two major switches in monetary policy occurred in the 1890's: the

approval and the subsequent repeal of the Sherman Act.

Consequently, we

decided to break the sample into three parts and to model de. in each period
J

with different ARIMA processes.

On the other hand, there is no reason to

believe that an analogous shift occurred in the variables generating the
post-attack money demand. Therefore, a unique ARIMA process for the whole
period was estimated for md ..
J

The result of the time series identification

and estimation procedure are summarized in Table 2.

While dct appears to be

AR(l) in all three subperiods, mdt is best approximated by a constant plus
white noise.
These estimated processes can be used to compute Et ht+j = Et dct+j - Et
mdt+j·

We now have everything necessary to compute the time series of the

probability of attack, which is presented in Figure 1.

The time pattern

displayed by this probability confirms our theoretical analysis.

The -

viability of the gold standard was not a problem until August of 1890, as
indicated by the probability of an attack being zero before that period.

As

our model predicted, the probability of collapse of the fixed exchange rate
regimes increases steadily during the three years following the approval of
the Sherman Act, reaching a maximum in October 1893, when the Act was
repealed.

Between 1894 and 1896 the probability decreases on average, with

most of the decline occurring when the borrowing operations were undertaken.

5. On the Optimal Size of the Loan
In order to address the issue of the optimal amount of borrowing we have
to identify the trade-off involved in borrowing international reserves.

On

the one hand, borrowing allows to reduce the probability of a collapse of the

10

fixed exchange rate regime, which is considered a valuable arrangement by the
monetary authority 12

On the other hand, the operation is costly in terms of

interest payments and, more generally, in term of possible increases in the
interest rate induced by the bond issue.

Formally, we can describe the

problem of determining the optimal size of the loan as follows:

(P-1)

where Bt is the amount of the loan, PVC( Bt) is the present value of the cost
of the borrowing operation, and Ct is the maximum cost that the monetary
authorities are willing to pay in order to guarantee the viability of the gold
standard.

In addition, in the environment under consideration there existed

other constraints of institutional nature. Specifically, the Treasury was
constrained in the choice of borrowing instruments by the Refunding Act (see
footnote 2).

Moreover, such borrowing could take place only in order to

replenish gold reserves when they had fallen below their minimum level of $100
millions.
How can we determine whether the borrowing policy of the Treasury during
the 1890's was the outcome of an optimization process of the kind described
above?

A minimal test is to verify that the institutional constraints were

satisfied ..

This was indeed the case: the type of bonds used were among the

ones allowed by the Refunding Act and, at the time of the borrowing

12 Here

we do not elaborate on why this might be the case. A paper that
discusses the optimality of fixed exchange rates is Mundell (1973).
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operations, the Treasury's gold reserves were below $100 millions (see Figure
2).

In the following, we propose a more interesting way of investigating the

rationale behind the behavior of the Treasury and the optimality of its
actions.

This will involve the use of information that are revealed by the

particular circumstances in which the third issue (February, 1895) took place.
The bond issue of February 1895 is particularly intriguing because in
that episode, the Treasury used the the services of a syndicate of private
bankers.

The terms of the agreement are stated in the contract that J.P.

Morgan and August Belmont, as representatives of the syndicate, signed with
the U.S. Treasury.

The Belmont-Morgan contract stipulated the purchase of

gold coins by the Treasury, in exchange for 30 year 2.4% bonds.
of the issue was $62.3 million.
equivalent to 3.75% at par.

The par value

It was purchased by the syndicate at a price

In addition, and of most importance, the

syndicate agreed that " ... so far as it lies within their power, will exert all
financial influences and will make all legitimate efforts to protect the
Treasury of the United States against withdrawls of gold, pending the complete
performance of the contract."
With this provision the syndicate granted the Treasury a zero-interest
line of credit in gold for the duration of the contract.

13

Throughout the

duration of the contract, in fact, the syndicate delivered between $20 and $25
million in gold to the Treasury, in exchange for legal tender.

This

operation, therefore, guaranteed the Treasury both a long term financing, i.e.
the 30 year bonds, and a short term financing, i.e. the line of credit.

13

The duration of the contract was implicitly fixed at six months. The use
of the term "line of credit" is perhaps inaccurate in this context. The real
nature of the deal was an on-call exchange of gold for paper money. The
contract had additional minor provisions that will not be expressly considered
in the present paper. For a discussion, see Garber and Grilli (1985).
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Note that the contract has the characteristic of a "firm commitment"
contract, one by which the investment banker underwrites the entire issue,
guaranteeing to the issuer a fixed amount of funds.

However, the choice of

this contract, instead of other alternative forms like "best effort," was made
for other reasons in addition to the insurance advantage.

It is quite

possible that the Treasury expected to be able to market the issue directly,
at a price higher than the one agreed upon with the syndicate.

The spread not

only compensated the syndicate for undertaking the risk and for the
distribution efforts, but was also a way to pay for the line of credit.

This

form of contract enabled the Treasury to secure short term financing without
obtaining an explicit approval from the Congress, which they were not willing
to concede.
Following the approach taken above, we view the Belmont-Morgan contract
as the result of an optimization problem that the Treasury had to solve in
order to assure the practicability of the gold standard.

In addition to the

constraints we mentioned before, the Treasury had to guarantee a minimum level
of profit to the syndicate, in order to compensate it for underwritng the bond
issue and for providing the line of credit.

Recalling that the probability of

a speculative attack is a monotonically decreasing function in the amount of
gold borrowed, we can express the optimizaton problem as:

(P-2)

p'N+Gc

max
N Ge
'
s.t. (a)

[p(N) - p' ]N - I(Gc)

1f

(b) G T < 100
0
(c) r

::S

r

max

(or p'

~

p'min)

~

K
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C

N and G represent the number of one dollar bonds in the issue and the dollar
amount of line credit respectivel y.

~

is the profit of the syndicate; p, a

function of N, is the price at which the bond is purchased by the public and
p' is the price at which it is underwritte n by the syndicate; I, a function of
e
G

,

.

1S

the cost of providing the line of credit; K is the minimum level of

profit required by the syndicate in order to perform the services; GT is the
0

level of gold reserves in the Treasury before the contract was signed; r is
the interest rate at which the bond issue is underwritte n and r
maximum possible level.

max

is its

In writing constraint (c) we assumed that the cost of

the borrowing operation can be approximate d by the interest payed on the loan.
Note that, given the characteris tics of the bond (i.e.30 years@ 4%) and
assuming that the last constraint holds with equality, the knowledge of r
implies the knowledge of p'. , and vice versa.
min

max

The maximum allowed yield of

the operation has been implicitly revealed by the contract itself to be
r

max=3.75, and we take it as a given parameter.
In order to determine whether the behavior of the Treasury was consistent

with this interpretat ion of the facts, we solve the above optimizatio n
problem, derive the "optimal contract" as prescribed by our theory, and
compare it with the actual Belmont-Mor gan contract.
The solution of P-2

requires an estimate of constraint (a) which, in

turn, requires information about the demand for Treasury bonds, p(N), about
the costs of providing the line of credit, I(Gc), and about the amount of
profits, K, that the syndicate intended to make.

a.

The Demand for Treasury Bonds

To derive the relationshi p between the size of the bond issue and the
price at which it could have been distributed by the syndicate, the following

14

strategy was used.

As mentioned in section 2, in November 1894 the Treasury

issued a $50 million, 10 year bond@ 5%, to replenish the gold reserves that
had fallen below the required minimum of $100 million.

All the bids made for

the bond are recorded in the report of the investigation conducted by the
Committee on Finance in 1896.

14

With these data, the demand function faced

by the Treasury on that occasion can be traced out, and it is presented in
Figure 3.
In addition to this function, the report provides an additional piece of
information.

In particular, it reveals that a syndicate of bankers, J.P.

Morgan among them,

15

made two separate bids for that bond issue.

They offered

to purchase the whole issue at a price of 1.17077 per $1 par value, or to
purchase any part of it at 1.168898.

Note, however, that if the syndicate

expected to face the same demand function that the Treasury was facing, it
would have incurred a loss by acquiring the whole issue at 1.17077, since the
equilibrium price along the Treasury demand curve was 1.16306.

If we assume

that the syndicate was behaving rationally, we have to conclude that it
expected a larger demand for the bond than the one faced by the Treasury.
The reason for this difference is that the individuals may have had an
incentive to report a price to the Treasury that was lower than their true
reservation price.

This is because of the particular structure of the auction

used to allocate the issue.

The Treasury, in fact, was adopting a

discriminating auction, in which the bonds were assigned at the price bid,
14

The Committee was appointed to investigate the Treasury bond sales that
occurred during the years 1894-96.
15

Contrary to the Belmont-Morgan syndicate, the composition of this
syndicate is known. Even if we cannot be certain about it, it is very likely
that most of the members of the syndicate of November 1894 were also members
of the February 1895 syndicate.

15

starting from the highest bid and working downward until the whole issue was
allocated.

Under a discriminating auction, the mean and the variance of the

bids are lower than they would be under competitive auction, under which the
agent reveals his true reservation price. 16

This implies that the demand

curve derived from the bids to the Treasury has to be flatter and have a lower
intercept than the true demand curve, which the syndicate expected to face.
Despite the fact that the actual allocation mechanism used by the syndicate is
not known, a close examination and review of the journals of the time suggests
that competitive auction was utilized.

17

We must recover the actual demand faced by the syndicate -- a demand
different from the one faced by the Treasury.

Knowledcge of this syndicate's

demand function will be used to construct an estimate of the demand faced by
the February 1895 syndicate.

Since the two issues occurred within 10 weeks of

each other, we can make the reasonable assumption that the market demand did
not change in such a short period of time.

As a result, after accounting for

the fact that part of this demand ($50 million) was satisfied by the November
issue, we can consider it to be the demand for the February 1895 bond as well.
The demand function has to pass through the price at which the syndicate
sold the November 1894 issue (1.19).

18

This condition, with an assumption of

linearity (i.e. we assume p(N) = a - bN), identifies a set of possible demand
curves.

This set can be further narrowed by recognizing the existence of a

maximum price that any individual would be willing to pay for the bond.

16

The

These results can be found in Vickery (1966), Smith (1966), and Harris and
Raviv (1981), among others.
17

Commercial and Financial Chronicle, February 1895.

18

Commercial and Financial Chronicle, December 1, 1894.

16

maximum price has to be equal to or less than 1.24, which corresponds to a
yield of 2.3%, the interest rate of British consols, that were expressly
payable in gold.

Moreover, the maximum price has to be greater than or equal

to 1.21, which correspond to the slope of the linear approximati on of the
Treasury's demand function.

This condition guarantees that the Syndicate's

demand function is steeper than the one faced by the Treasury.

The set of

these demand curves is represented by the shaded area in Figure 4.

The

contracts correspondi ng to different demand curves in this family will be
computed to see if any of them support the actual Belmont-Mor gan contract as
an optimal outcome.

b.

The Syndicate's Expected Profit

The report on the November 1894 issue also contains information that can
be used to identify the level of profit that the syndicate intended to earn,
as a return on the underwritin g services that it provided.

If the Treasury

had accepted the "all or nothing" bid, the syndicate's expected profit would
have been:

(8)

where pis the expected demand function faced by the syndicate, N is the size
1
of the issue ($50 million) and p is the price offered by the syndicate for
1
the "all or nothing" arrangement .
5.

K is given by the area p *ABp , in Figure
1
1

If, instead, the Treasury had accepted the "all or any part" offer, the

syndicate profit would have been:

(9)

17

where N is the number of one dollar bonds that the Treasury would allocate to
2
the syndicate, and p

is the price offered by the syndicate under the "all or

2

any part" arrangement. 19

K

2

is given by-the area EACD in Figure 10.

Note

that the price at which the syndicate is able to sell the bonds it underwrites
is the same under the two arrangements, that is p(N )=p(N )=1.19.
1
2

If we

assume that the syndicate profit is a linear function of the number (in
millions) of underwritten securities, 20

K.i

i

1, 2

(10)

equations (8) and (9) can be solved to obtain k
k

1

= 0.015.

k

0

and k

1

0

= 0.19 and

are in the same units as Ki, i.e. in millions of

dollars.

c.

The Cost of Providing the Line of Credit

The last piece of information needed to solve the maximization problem is
an estimate of the cost of providing the line of credit.

By providing the

line of credit, the syndicate lost the opportunity to earn the interest that
is obtainable by lending the gold on the London market.
operation in terms of the interest loss is i

6

*G,
C

where i

The cost of the
6

*

is the six month

interest rate in London. 21

19

The value of N =50-16.5=33.5, where 16.5 is the quantity of bonds on the
2
Treasury demand function, corresponding to p .
2
20

This linear form is often used in actual contracts.
Raviv (1977).

See Mandelker and

21
Note again that six-months was the duration of the contract, i.e. the
period during which the syndicate had to provide the line of credit.

18

The syndicate, in addition to the interest loss, was also bearing a
second cost component, i.e. the capital loss that it expected in case the gold
standard collapsed.

If the Treasury were forced, by a speculative attack, to

abandon the defense of the parity, the dollar would have been devaluated
vis-a-vis the pound, thus increasing the price of gold.

Since the syndicate,

in providing the line of credit, was exchanging gold for dollars with the
Treasury, it would have suffered a loss proportional to the size of the
devaluation.

This expected capital loss is given by the spread between the

domestic and foreign interest rates, and it is represented by the interest
parity condition.

Therefore, the total cost of providing the line of credit

can be approximated by i Gc, where i is the domestic, six month interest
6
6
rate.

d.

Solving the Maximization Problem:

The Belmont-Morgan Contract

We finally have all of the elements to solve P-2.

The first order

conditions , can be solved to give:

N

(a - k

1

- p'(l - i

6

- k )) / 2b

1

(11)

(12)

By substituting into (11) and (12) the values of the parameters derived
in the previous sections, we obtain the optimal values of N and Ge
corresponding to different demand functions in the permissible set described
above.

The results are reported in Table 3.

Here bare the slopes of the
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linear demand functions
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N and Ge are in millions of dollars, and p(62.3) is

the price implied by each demand curve, given that N=62.3.

The values of

b=0.0004 and b=0.001 represent the boundaries of the feasible set.

However,

since the syndicate actually sold the issue at approximately 1.125, 23 we can
confidently concentrate our attention to the bottom part of the Table.

Recall

that in the actual contract N was $62.3 million and Ge was at least $20
million.

Therefore, our analysis produces a set of simulated contracts which

are quite similar to the Belmont-Morgan contract.

We interpret this result as

evidence that the Treasury's borrowing policy of the 1890's was motivated by
the desire of mantaining the gold standard and that, in so doing, it behaved
in an efficient way.

6.

Conclusions

This paper analyzes the behavior of monetary authorities when facing an
irnrnenent collapse of the exchange rate.

In particular, it studied the

effectiveness of borrowing international reserves to avoid devaluations.

The

attention was focussed on a particular episode, i.e. the exchange rate crisis
of 1894-96.

We concluded that borrowing policies are effective in avoiding

temporary exchange rate crises, and that the specific borrowing policy
followed by the U.S. Treasury in that event was not only effective but also
optimal when considered in the light of the economic environment and the set
of institutional and political constraints that it was facing.
Nowadays, the procedure of borrowing from private bankers has been
22

Remember that the intercept is the same for all demand functions, and it
is equal to 1.19, i.e. the price at which the issue of November 1894 was sold
by the Syndicate.
23

Commercial and Financial Chronicle, February 1895.

20

replaced by the practice of obtaining lines of credit from foreign monetary
authorities (central banks).

It is interesting to note, however, how the

basic mechanism of obtaining short-term lines of credit, instead of a formal
long-term loan like the one introduced in the episode we considered, is still
in operation.

In fact this kind of device is institutionalized in exchange

arrangements like the EMS where private banking syndicates are replaced by the
pool of the central banks participating in the system.

A natural extension of

this analysis is to study the timing and the size of the borrowing of
international reserves which occured in more recent years, in particular
during the working of Bretton Woods and of the European Monetary System.
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Data Appendix

1.

The money stock is given by the sum of: (i) gold coins and gold

certificates in circulation, (ii) silver dollars, subsidiary silver coins and
silver certificates in circulation and (iii) Treasury Notes, U.S. Notes
(greenbacks), National Bank Notes and Currency Certificates in circulation.
All Monetary aggregates are taken from the National Monetary Commission
(1910).

2.

The domestic component of the money supply has been computed by

subtracting the gold, gold certificates in circulation, and the gold reserves
in the Treasury from the total money stock in circulation.

3.

The U.S. price index is the Warren & Pearson price index from "Index

Number of the Wholesale Prices of all commodities, 1720 to 1932," in Warren
and Pearson (1933), Table 1 pg. 10.

4.

The U.K. price index is the Sauerbeck price index from "Monthly

Fluctuations of the Index Number of Forty-Five Commodities," in Sauerbeck
(1895) and (1897).

5

As a measure of the level of activity, I used bank clearings outside New

York City, from Macaulay (1938), Table 27.

Bank clearings represent dollar

totals of checks and drafts drawn on individual banks and credited to the
accounts of other banks through the city clearing house association to which
the individual bank belonged.

New York City's large volume of bank clearings

is attributable to financial transactions that largely reflect stock and bond

22

transactions.

As a result, bank clearings outside New York City are a more

reliable indicator of the movement in output and trade than total clearings.

6.

The U.S. nominal interest rate is the interest rate on call loans; the

U.K. interest rate is the interest rate allowed for deposits at call by
Discount Houses, from the National Monetary Commission (1910) and the
Commercial and Financial Chronicle, various issues.
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TABLE 1
MONEY DEMAND ESTIMATE:

Parameter

JANUARY 1889 - DECEMBER 1896

Estimate

Standard
Error

f3

4.435

1.140

'Y

0.755

0.311

a

0.040

0.0129

D.W.
2.05
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TABLE 2
ESTIMATES OF dct PROCESS

al

a

a2

Q(20)

Jan89-Aug90

0.359
(0.560)

0.945
(0.085)

0.009

9.22

Sept90-0ct93

0.323
(0.178)

0.954
(0.026)

0.012

13.87

Nov93-Dec96

0.734
(0.449)

0.893
(0.065)

0.019

16.35

ESTIMATES OF mdt PROCESS
a

al

Jan89-Dec96

5.602
(0.018)

0.178

Q(20)

11.11

Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. Q(20) is the Q-statistics for 20
lags testing for the residuals being white noise
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Table 3
Optimal Contracts
b

Ge

N

p(62.3)

0.0004

140.39

55.17

1.16508

0.0005

112.31

43.10

1.15885

0.0006

93.60

35.05

1.15262

0.0007

80.22

29.30

1.14639

0.0008

70.20

24.99

1.14016

0.0009

62.40

21.64

1.13393

0.001

56.15

18.96

1.12770

